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1  Introduction  
 
The debate concerning the apparent conflict between equality (section 9 of the 
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 108 of 1996) and culture (sections 30 and 
31 of the 1996 Constitution) is ongoing. This debate, in many ways foreseen, was pre-
empted by the Constitutional Court per Sachs J in Du Plessis and Others v de Klerk 
and Another,
3
 when he stated at paragraph [189] that " . . . sooner or later, the question 
of the relationship between the Constitution and customary or indigenous law will have 
to be confronted."  The Court went further to predict a possible outcome to this conflict, 
when it found that:  
"…patriarchal principles which underlie much of indigenous law would be outlawed by 
the Bill of Rights, thereby undermining the core of indigenous  
law."
4 
 
Until recently this conflict remained part of the paper war between, amongst others, 
traditionalists (striving to preserve the traditional way of life), and particularly feminists 
(fighting to eradicate all bastions of patriarchy, such as primogeniture and the 
negotiation of lobolo). In 1997, the court caught its first glimpse of this troubled war.  In 
Ryland v Edros
5
 the court, per Farlam J, stressed that there is a duty placed on the 
judiciary to apply the "values of equality and tolerance of diversity", which "radiate . . . 
the concepts of public policy and boni mores". In this decision the court took into 
account the plural nature of our society, when it  
 
 
 
1 Based on a paper read at the Congress of the Society of Law Teachers of Southern Africa 
(SLTSA) 2000 held in Durban on 3-6 July 2000.  
2 Lecturer: Department Private Law, Vista University (Bloemfontein).  
3 Du Plessis and Others v de Klerk and Another 1996 3 SA 850 (CC).  
4 4 Ex Parte Chairperson of the Constitutional Assembly: In re Certification of the Constitution of 
the Republic of  South Africa 1996 4 SA 744 (CC) par [200].  
  5  Ryland v Edros 1997 2 SA 690 (C) at 709 B-C.  
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interpreted the Constitution, as advocated by Farlam J.  
In the Mthembu-decisions, the judiciary was faced with yet another opportunity to give 
effect to this value of diversity, but the court, at its own admission, sometimes 
expressly, sometimes implicitly, had struggled in all three the cases, to give effect to 
the duty illustrated in Ryland's case.  
In the first Mthembu-case
6
 the court found itself unable, due to a lack of information, to 
make an order relating to the validity of a customary marriage, and subsequently 
referred the matter for oral evidence. The court in the second Mthembu-case
7
 found in 
favour of the customary rules of intestate succession, but adhered to the parties' 
submission that it was common cause that no customary marriage existed. It was 
hoped that the appeal
8
 would give matters a different complexion, but unfortunately the 
court decided the matter without referring to the existence of a valid customary 
marriage.  
Two very important questions were raised in the Mthembu-decisions, namely the 
influence and meaning of the principle of primogeniture, and whether a valid customary 
marriage was contracted between the deceased and the appellant. In order to 
accurately and effectively facilitate an analysis of the three decisions, one has to take 
note of the customary rules of intestate succession and the requirements for a valid 
customary marriage.  
The question re the validity of the marriage contracted between the deceased and the 
appellant, the effect of the illegitimacy of the child Thembi, born from the union, as well 
as the manner in which the respective courts and counsel dealt with the issue of 
validity, forms the crux of this critique. The purpose of this note is to analyse the 
decisions of the respective courts, with reference to a discussion of the rules of 
customary intestate succession and the requirements for a valid customary marriage, 
and then to propose a possible different outcome which, if applied  
 
 
6 Mthembu v Letsela 1997 (2) SA 936 (T).  
7 Mthembu v Letsela 1998 (2) SA 675 (T).  
8 Mthembu v Letsela 2000 (3) SA 867 (SCA).  
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by the courts, would have been beneficial to all the parties involved. This then leads to 
a proposal of an alternative remedy to the postulated problem.  
 
2  Customary rules of intestate succession  
 
The customary rules of intestate succession are based on two predominant features. 
The first is the continuation of the family lineage of the husband as the family head, 
along with the principle of primogeniture, according to which the eldest male 
descendant of the deceased succeeds to the property, position, status and standing of 
the deceased.
9
 The second is the concept of the family and the collective rights and 
responsibilities within each respective family grouping.
10
 This sentiment is eloquently 
described by Jack Simons
11
 as follows:  
 
Male primogeniture is consistent with the structure and functions of the joint 
family. The general heir, who succeeds to the office as well as to an estate, must 
be a male, because only a man can be a head of a household in the traditional 
society. Intestate succession through the male line forestalls the partitioning of 
an estate, and keeps it intact for the support of the widow, unmarried daughters 
and younger sons.  
 
This system is further entrenched by the provisions of the Black Administration Act 38 
of 1927 (hereinafter 'the 1927 Act'), read with the provisions of the Intestate Succession 
Act 81 of 1987, which clearly states in section 23 thereof, that all moveable property 
belonging to a black person will, upon his death, devolve and be administered under 
"black law and custom".  Immovable property will, in accordance with custom, devolve 
upon one male person.  The State President (as the office was then known) could in 
terms of the 1927 Act issue regulations prescribing the manner in which the estates of 
deceased black people were to be administered and distributed. Government Notice 
R200 of 1987 (The regulations for the administration and distribution of the  
 
9  Olivier ea Indigenous Law 147-148.  
10  Bekker Customary Law in Southern Africa 273.  
11  Simons African Women 239.  
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estates of deceased Blacks) was issued in terms of this section.  Regulation 2 of the 
Notice regulates the situation where the deceased left no valid will, or dies intestate (a 
regulation, which was, in the third Mthembu-case, found to be in keeping with public 
policy, as will be indicated below).  
 
These rules of succession are clearly geared towards the perpetuation of male 
dominance, albeit for the perseverance of family unity or economic stability. The heir 
has the same standing and status as the deceased had. Plainly stated - he steps into 
the shoes of his predecessor.  He has the function of guardian over minors, he controls 
the family property, he is burdened with the same responsibility with regards to the 
payment and reception of lobolo, debts and other fines, and the maintenance of all the 
inhabitants of the kraal, specifically the widow and her children.  
 
The widow and her children are entitled to proper maintenance and the successor has 
the right to allocate a place of residence to her.  Even though it is a cardinal rule, with 
certain exceptions, that women may not inherit from men, this does not leave the 
widow to her own devices. She has a recognised claim for maintenance, despite the 
fact that she has no actual inheritance.
12
 This duty to maintain is not taken lightly, and 
rightly so, for, to a certain extent, the family head lives on through his heir.  
 
This seeming special treatment reserved to the widow is based on the fact that the 
death of the husband does not ordinarily dissolve a customary marriage, and that the 
wife (now the widow) remains a wife to the deceased and a member of his family. All 
this is premised on the fact that the widow and the deceased were indeed legally 
married, for the duty to maintain reaches only as far as 'legitimate' widows, and for that 
matter, 'legitimate' children.  
 
3 The requirements for a valid customary marriage and the importance of 
lobolo  
In order to ascertain whether the union constituted a valid customary marriage, and 
therefore  
 
 
12  Bennett African Customary Law for Southern Africa 416.  
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whether the woman was the legitimate wife and widow of the deceased, one has to 
determine whether the marriage complied with the requirements for validity, such as 
the consent of the father of the bride, the actual transfer of the bride and, the highly 
controversial lobolo arrangement.  
 
Bride-wealth or lobolo has always been a very important part of the marriage 
negotiations.  The physical delivery of lobolo is not an essential requirement for validity, 
but the subsequent nondelivery can give rise to grounds for the annulment of the 
marriage.
13
 Its importance is illustrated by the fact that the marriage is regarded as 
'incomplete', or that the status of the children born out of such a marriage is ultimately 
affected by the non-compliance with the lobolo requirement, in that they are considered 
to be illegitimate.
14  
 
4  The importance of the Mthembu-decisions  
It is at this juncture that the importance of the Mthembu-cases becomes apparent.  
Tebalo Wilson Letsela (hereinafter 'the deceased') died on 13 August 1993.  At the time 
of his death he was the holder of a 99 year leasehold title in respect of a fixed property 
situated in Vosloorus.  He lived on the property with the appellant (Mildred Hleziphi 
Mthembu) and her two minor daughters. One of these children, Thembi, was born on 7 
April 1988 of an intimate relationship between the appellant and the deceased. The 
deceased was also survived by his father (the first respondent), his mother and his 
three sisters. The deceased's father and mother, along with one of his sisters and her 
children lived with the deceased, the appellant and her daughters on the property.  
 
The appellant alleged that she and the deceased entered into a customary marriage on 
14 June 1992 (less than 14 months before his death).  She supported this allegation 
with the receipt for the first instalment of R900.00, towards her lobolo of R2000.00. The 
balance was to be paid soon thereafter. The deceased, however, died before it was 
paid. The appellant claimed that she is the widow of the deceased, on the grounds that 
a valid customary marriage was entered into by  
 
13  Olivier ea Indigenous Law 40.  
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herself and the deceased, and that her child was therefore legitimized by their 
subsequent nuptials.  
 
The matter first came before Le Roux J (the first Mthembu-case), who was unable to 
resolve the factual dispute relating to the existence or otherwise of a customary 
marriage between the appellant and the deceased. The court referred the issue for oral 
evidence. The issue was accordingly postponed sine die.  
 
In the second Mthembu-case it was accepted that because no evidence was tendered 
from either side, that the matter was to be decided on the assumption that there was 
indeed no such marriage between the parties.  
 
The Supreme Court of Appeal per Mpati J found (at par [17]) that  
. . . (t)he position with regard to an illegitimate child is that he or she is  
legitimized by subsequent payment of dowry or bridewealth and
parents. (Emphasis in the original)  
 marriage of the  
and that there  
. . . must . . . be a marriage and not merely a payment of bridewealth or part of it  
for the child to be 'transferred' into the father's family.  
 
It followed that, despite the fact that part of the lobolo was paid, Thembi was not 
legitimized, because no valid marriage existed between the appellant and the 
deceased.  It was found that she therefore belonged to the family of her mother.  The 
matter was accordingly decided on the premise the Thembi is the deceased's 
illegitimate child (at par [8] of the SCA judgment), and therefore that  
 
. . . in terms of this system of succession, whether or not Thembi is the deceased's 
legitimate child, being female, she does not qualify as heir to the deceased's  
 
 
14  Olivier ea Indigenous Law 32-34.  
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estate. Women generally do not inherit in customary law.  
 
5  The question re constitutionality  
 
Even though the subject-matter of the discussion is clear from the above, namely that it 
was considered common cause in all the courts that no customary marriage existed, 
and that Thembi is therefore illegitimate, it is important to mention the issues that were 
indeed decided, as its importance will become apparent in the discussion below.   
 
In both the first and the second Mthembu cases, as well as in the SCA decision, it was 
argued that the customary rule of succession, i.e. the principle of primogeniture, is 
grossly discriminatory, in that it not only discriminates against black women and girls, 
but also against children born out of wedlock. The claim was based on an alleged 
contravention of subsections 8(1) and (2) and section 14 of the 1993 Constitution.  
 
In the first Mthembu-case Le Roux J found that, considering that the duty to maintain 
the widow and her children and the other members of the deceased's household is a 
necessary counterpart of the principle of primogeniture, the differentiation between men 
and women ceases to be unfair. Therefore the evidence of prima facie discrimination is 
refuted by the concomitant duty to support.
15
 In the second Mthembu-case Mynhart J 
dismissed the application to declare the customary rule of primogeniture, which 
generally excludes African women from intestate succession and regulation 2 of GN 
R200 of 1987 issued in terms of section 23(10) of the 1927 Act, invalid on the ground of 
its inconsistency with the provisions of the 1993 Constitution.  The court found that the 
existence of the concomitant duty to support, which was placed on the heir, rendered 
such differentiation justifiable.  
 
In the case before the Supreme Court of Appeal, counsel for the appellant, persisted in 
centring their argument on the following propositions: first that Thembi would have 
succeeded by  
 
 
15  Mthembu v Letsela 1997 (2) SA 936 (T) at 945H-946C.  
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intestate succession at customary law to her deceased father's estate but for the fact 
that she is female, and secondly, that the principle of primogeniture is offensive to 
public policy or natural justice, because it is incompatible with the value of equality.  
The Court dismissed the first proposition, namely the allegation of gender 
discrimination, with the following admission at par [33]:  "The gender discrimination 
[question] is not reached in this case" because in casu it would amount to an academic 
exercise only, and that " . . . it is not desirable to address a question of such 
constitutional importance . . ." in these circumstances. The second proposition was 
disposed of with the same ease, as it noted that regulations issued in terms of section 
23(10) of the Black Administration Act, are indeed legislative recognition of "black" laws 
and custom, allowing black people the opportunity to choose how they wish their 
estates to be devolved upon their death, either by means of customary rules or by 
means of a will. The court further found (at par [24]) that, taking this aspect into 
account,  
 
. . . it is difficult to see how a regulation which respects the [choice of the  
individual] can be said to be unreasonable and ultra vires at common law.  
 
6 The non-decision  
 
It is not the ultimate SCA decision, based on the above-mentioned propositions, that 
forms the basis of my critique, but rather the manner in which this case was dealt with 
from the outset, viz. the persistence of counsel that the court addresses the possible 
unconstitutionality of the rules of African customary law, at the expense of the parties 
seeking remedy. It is not my intention to deal with the question of constitutionality, but 
rather with the lack of recognition given to the principles underlying, to my mind, the 
core issue of this case, namely the question whether a valid union existed between the 
appellant and the deceased, thereby allowing Thembi her rightful claim to maintenance 
by her deceased father's heir.  
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Bennett
16 
states clearly that in customary law the husband and his family have full 
parental rights to any children born to the wife during the marriage, provided that they 
fulfilled their obligations under the bridewealth agreement. It goes without saying that, 
in terms of custom, in the instance where these marriage obligations were not met, the 
parental rights will befall the maternal family, and the child born from such a union is 
considered illegitimate, and will not be able to inherit from the paternal family.  
 
In Mthembu's case the marriage between the deceased and the appellant was 
considered to be null, for one of the prerequisites for validity, namely the payment of 
the entire lobolo amount (per the SCA), was not met, a fact considered common cause 
by the parties, and which was therefore not argued in any of the courts.  The 
consequence of this state of affairs is that, from the outset, Thembi was labelled 
illegitimate, and Mildred (the mother) was excluded from benefiting from the duties of 
the heir.  The court quoted from an article by Burman
17
 to substantiate its contention 
that the failure to comply fully with the prerequisite lobolo-payment, will affect the 
legitimacy of children born from such marriages.  Burman stated that  
 
. . . (i)n customary law a child born in a customary union is presumed to 
be legitimate and thus part of the father's family.  However, as outlined 
above, the crucial element in the marriage
 
 which transfers the child into 
the father's family is not the ceremony, as in civil law, but the payment of 
bridewealth, at least in part. (Emphasis in SCA decision.)   
With respect I differ from the interpretation given by the court to the cited passage, 
specifically as to the meaning of the underlined words. It is my submission that a child 
born within a customary marriage is presumed to be legitimate and thus part of the 
father's family, irrespective of the lobolo amount paid.  This statement cannot be 
applied in an unqualified manner - even though actual delivery of the lobolo is not cited 
as an essential requirement, it is trite that the  
 
16  Bennett African Customary Law for Southern Africa 289.  
17  Burman 1991 Acta Juridica 41.  
AM Janse van Rensburg  PER/PELJ 2001(4)1 
 
68/74 
 
later non-compliance with the payment obligation can render such a union null, and 
ultimately affect the status of the children.  Therefore if the requisite marriage payments 
are not made, parental rights are bound to be uncertain.  It is uncertain what period will 
constitute a reasonable period before the sanction of nullity strikes at the validity of the 
marriage.  It has to be kept in mind that a customary marriage is by no means a single 
event, but rather a protracted ritual, commencing with the engagement negotiations 
and sometimes concluding with the delivering of the lobolo. This is not a fixed ritual. 
The marriage agreement is a communal affair, involving two family groupings, and the 
format is open to the whims of the parties involved.  There is in principle nothing to 
prevent them from making another arrangement if they wished.  They have to comply 
with the essentialia of a valid marriage, which entails, amongst other things, that lobolo 
must be negotiated. The union is considered valid as long as these requirements are 
met. This sentiment is echoed by Discussion Paper 74 of the South African Law 
Commission on Customary Marriages
18
 at page 43 where it is stated that  
 
. . . (e)ven in cases where bridewealth was considered essential, the courts 
did not specify whether the goods had to be physically delivered or whether a 
mere agreement sufficed.  In practice, it proved impossible to insist on 
delivery, for the husband's ability to pay had to be taken into account.  
 
It is submitted that, given time, the deceased would have complied with the bridewealth 
obligations. It is further submitted that a valid customary marriage was contracted 
between the deceased and the appellant. The submission is based on the following 
propositions: in casu the deceased promised to fulfil the lobolo payment obligation.  He 
died before he could fulfil the entire promise, but after he paid more than 45% of the 
lobolo amount.  This fact, along with the notion that the best interest of the child must at 
all times be served, must surely serve as sufficient motivation to consider that a valid 
marriage existed, and therefore that Thembi was indeed legitimized by the subsequent 
marriage of her parents.  
 
18  Part of Project 90 re the Harmonisation of the Common Law and the Indigenous Law.  
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7 An alternative remedy  
Given the conclusion of the court that no valid customary marriage existed between the 
deceased and the appellant, an alternative approach is proposed which would have, it 
is submitted, served the best interests of all the parties involved. This alternative, via a 
regulation, found by the SCA to be in keeping with the principles of natural justice and 
public policy, was never argued but could have been applied successfully.  
 
Regulation 2 of Government Notice R200 of 1987 provides in subsection (d) thereof 
that  
 
. . . (w)hen any deceased Black is survived by any partner - 
(iii) who was at the time of his death living with him as his putative spouse; . 
. . and the circumstances are such as in the opinion of the Minister to 
render the application of Black law and custom to the devolution of the 
whole, or some part, of his property inequitable . . . the Minister may direct 
that said property . . . shall devolve as if the (parties) . . . had been lawfully 
married
 
 out of community of property, whether or not such was in fact the 
case . . . and as if the said Black person had been a European. (My 
emphasis.)  
Regulation 2 states clearly that an intestate estate will dissolve according to customary 
law, unless the Minister determines otherwise, if the application of the customary rules 
of intestate succession proved inappropriate or inequitable. This determination can be 
made on application by the surviving putative spouse who was living with the deceased 
at the time of his death. The determination is to the affect that the common law 
principles of intestate succession be applied as if the parties had been lawfully married 
out of community of property.  This would render section 1(1)(c) of the Intestate 
Succession Act 81 of 1987 applicable.  
 
A putative marriage comes into existence when one or both of the parties bona fide 
believe that a lawful marriage was indeed contracted; or were bona fide unaware of the 
existence of a fact nullifying their union, such as the non-compliance of an essential 
requirement.  Such a shortcoming renders the marriage contract null and ab initio void, 
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but irrespective of this fact, the children born out of such a union are regarded to be 
legitimate.  
 
It is submitted that, in the event that it is found that a marriage was never contracted 
due to a non-compliance with the essentialia of a valid marriage, viz the payment of the 
full lobolo amount (as was the case in the Mthembu-decisions), the parties were 
putative spouses, to the extent that the appellant was under the bona fide impression 
that she was the legal wife of the deceased, as a result of the part payment of the 
agreed lobolo amount.  It is further submitted that, given the bona fides of the appellant, 
this matter calls for a determination, in terms of regulation 2, by the Minister or an 
appropriate functionary, on the application by the appellant.  
 
Owing to the status of the marriage after such an application and the determination by 
the Minister regarding the applicability of the common law, the estate of the deceased 
would devolve as if the parties who contracted the union were "Europeans", and 
married out of community of property.  Based on this fact it is submitted that the 
appellant would, in terms of section 1(1)(c) of the Intestate Succession Act, have had a 
legitimate claim to half of the difference in accrual, as well as a child's share or an 
amount to the value of R125 000.00, whichever is the larger amount.  Her child on the 
other hand would also have benefited under the provision mentioned, irrespective of 
her illegitimate standing (section 1(2)). It can also be argued that the appellant's other 
daughter was adopted by the deceased through the payment of the lobolo, and that the 
child became the child of the deceased.
19
 This child would also have benefited from the 
intestate estate.
20  
 
8  Conclusion  
Were the approach that Thembi should have been afforded the benefit of a legitimate 
child, her grandfather, as the eldest male heir of the deceased, would have been duty-
bound to maintain her and her mother.  This would have ensured the correct 
application of the principle of  
 
19  Thibela v Minister van Wet en Orde 1995 3 SA 147 (SCA).  
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primogeniture and the concomitant duty to support the household of the deceased.  
 
It is submitted that the interests of both the parties, especially that of the minor child, 
would have been served best if the marriage was regarded to be valid from the outset, 
irrespective of the fact that the full lobolo amount was never paid.  This is based on the 
fact that the delivery of lobolo is not set down as an essential for validity, that the best 
interest of the child must at all times be served and that the deceased died before he 
could fulfill his promise to pay the full amount.  
 
Were the second approach followed, viz a determination made in terms of regulation 2, 
the appellant, as the putative spouse of the deceased, would have been able to inherit 
under the common law principles of intestate succession. More specifically section 
1(1)(c) of the Intestate Succession Act would have been made applicable as the 
deceased is survived by a spouse and a child, and, also, even the adopted child of the 
deceased.  
 
If the argument of the courts is to be followed, namely that no valid marriage existed 
between the parties, it is submitted that the available remedy, namely regulation 2, 
which was found to be in keeping with the principles of natural justice and public policy, 
ought to have been applied to the application of the appellant, and that the matter 
should have been referred back to the court of first instance for an order to be made to 
the effect that the appellant be regarded as the putative spouse of the deceased, and 
therefore that his immoveable property be devolved onto her, in accordance with the 
common law.   
 
These cases, as indicated above, serve as a prime example of the consequences 
faced by the parties, when the courts and, to a large extent, counsel, attempt to force a 
decision on the culture-equality issue. The application of customary law should not be 
ignored.  Through the application of for example section 1(1) of the Laws of Evidence 
Amendment Act 45 of 1988 (or similar tools), a court might call upon an expert witness 
to give evidence as to the existence or not of a valid customary marriage between the 
deceased and the appellant.  
 
20  S 1(4) of the Intestate Succession Act 81 of 1987.  
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It is clear that Thembi could have been adequately protected, but in the outcome she 
was left without an inheritance and without the support that she needed.  In future it is 
hoped that the following caveat be kept in mind: one should never lose sight of the 
individual cause, when faced with the ever-present question of what weighs the 
heavier, equality or culture, and one should keep the approach advocated by Farlam J 
expressed in Ryland v Edros (quoted above) in mind, and thus cultivate a culture of 
understanding, in a country characterized by diversity.  
AM Janse van Rensburg  PER/PELJ 2001(4)1 
 
73/74 
 
Bibliography  
Bekker Customary Law in Southern Africa  
Bekker JC Seymour's Customary Law in Southern Africa 5th edition (Juta Cape Town 
1989)  
 
Bennett African Customary Law for Southern Africa 
 Bennett TW Sourcebook of African Customary Law for Southern Africa (Juta Cape 
Town 1995)  
 
Burman 1991 Acta Juridica  
Burman S "Illegitimacy and the African family in a changing South Africa" 1991 Acta 
Juridica 36  
 
Olivier ea Indigenous Law  
Olivier NJJ ea Indigenous Law (Butterworths Durban 1995)  
 
Simons African Women  
Simons J African Women (Hurst and Co London 1968)  
 
Register of acts  
 
Black Administration Act 38 of 1927  
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996  
Intestate Succession Act 81 of 1987  
Laws of Evidence Amendment Act 45 of 1988  
 
Register of cases  
 
Du Plessis and Others v de Klerk and Another 1996 3 SA 850 (CC)  
AM Janse van Rensburg  PER/PELJ 2001(4)1 
 
74/74 
 
Ex Parte Chairperson of the Constitutional Assembly: In re Certification of the 
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 1996 4 SA 744 (CC)  
Mthembu v Letsela 1997 (2) SA 936 (T).  
Mthembu v Letsela 1998 (2) SA 675 (T) 376-377.  
Mthembu v Letsela 2000 (3) SA 867 (SCA).  
Ryland v Edros 1997 2 SA 690 (C)  
Thibela v Minister van Wet en Orde 1995 3 SA 147 (SCA)  
